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Dallaire is especially hard on France,
Britain, and the United States for their
refusal to provide assistance or authorize the UN to take timely measures to
block the massacre. He attributes their
inaction in part to France’s other interests in the region (the president’s son is
said to have had business interests in
Rwanda) and to fear in the Clinton administration of another Somalia debacle.
(Although Dallaire does not mention it,
the Clinton administration’s lack of response was to have severe consequences
for the United States when Osama Bin
Laden interpreted its unwillingness to
act as American weakness.) Dallaire is
not easy on Canada either. He refuses
in his book to place blame on anyone
within the UN leadership; however, in a
later interview with a San Francisco radio talk-show host, Dallaire thoroughly
castigated Boutros-Ghali as having been
more responsible than anyone else for
the genocide.
Command of UNAMIR had profound effects on the Canadian general, among
them post-traumatic stress disorder.
When he was relieved and returned to
Canada, he was offered, and he accepted,
the number-two post in the Canadian
army. Haunted by his experience in
Rwanda, he retired before his term ended.
This is an excellent example of a good
and highly competent man deeply disturbed by international failures and the
Machiavellian tactics of world powers.
His experience with the United Nations
raises the question of how far a military
commander should go in honoring orders from civilian authority. The precedent of the Nuremburg trials provides
military officers with sanction to refuse
orders that would produce sins of commission. But what about the “sins of
omission”? There are no precedents,
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which arguably prevented Dallaire from
taking measures to block the genocide.
In the book’s preface, Dallaire recounts
how a retired army chaplain asked him
if he still believed in God after his African experience. His reply was “yes, because he had shaken hands with the
Devil.” The work has had wide success
in Canada but not as yet in the United
States. (The American reader should
note that morning or evening “prayers”
refers to staff consultations, not religious observances.) Shake Hands with
the Devil is an important book and
should be read by every military officer
and senior noncommissioned officer.
ROBERT C. WHITTEN

Commander, USNR (Retired)
Cupertino, Calif.

Record, Jeffrey. Dark Victory: America’s Second
War against Iraq. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2005. 205pp. $49.90

Jeffrey Record is one of the nation’s
most experienced and respected defense
analysts. His latest critique of the 2003
Iraq war, Dark Victory, provides many
important insights into the reasons for
the war and for its successes and failures. More generally, this work is a case
study of the challenges of transforming
military victory into a victory with
meaningful and lasting strategic impact.
In many ways this book focuses on the
critical difference between “war fighter”
and “war winner,” and on the fact that
conflict termination and its aftermath
are at least as critical as any phase of
battle proper.
Record, however, writes as a critic of a
war he does not believe in, and of a
nation-building process he sees as a
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nearly disastrous failure. His book is a
policy argument, not a dispassionate
analysis, and needs to be read as such.
There are also times when his focus on
the argument gets in the way of his
analysis.
Chapter 1, for example, contrasts the
invasion of Iraq in 2003 with the 1990–
91 Gulf war. It raises a number of valid
arguments about the difference between
the consensus building in the first war
and the somewhat unilateral nature of
the second, but it also implies that the
United States could have toppled
Saddam’s regime by extending the war
long enough to destroy the Republican
Guards or by some undefined actions to
support the Kurdish and Shi’ite uprisings. It does not really address the fact
that the U.S. and coalition forces were
even less prepared for stability operations and nation building in 1991 than
was the Bush administration for the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
More importantly, chapter 1 raises
problems that as yet no analyst of war
and its aftermath has convincingly addressed for either Iraq wars or other
modern conflicts. Like the chapters that
follow, it does not discuss the practical
challenges in moving from limited war
to total war or the problems inherent in
the unpredictable nature of stability operations and nation building.
Record’s analysis of the failures of both
Bush administrations to deal with the
aftermath of military victory is remarkably insightful, but it is far from clear
that the postwar situation in Iraq was in
fact controllable or that a successful process of conflict termination and nation
building could have been put in place.
As Record points out in many other areas
of his discussion, the fact that the United
States is a superpower does not mean that
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severe limits do not exist on what it can
and cannot do; the broader question that
surrounds the current nation-building effort in Iraq is whether any such effort on
this scale can work.
This same issue pervades Record’s criticism of neoconservative ideology, theory, and practice in chapter 2 and
thereafter. It simply is not clear that
“realists,” pragmatists, or “neoliberals”
would ultimately be able to achieve lasting strategic success. Certainly, remembering the arrogance and failures of the
Rostow brothers (Walt and Eugene),
McGeorge Bundy, and Robert
McNamara, this reviewer had a horrible
feeling of déjà vu when reading through
Record’s discussion of the failures of
the policy makers of the George W.
Bush administration. The impact was
strikingly similar to that of the conclusion of George Orwell’s Animal Farm
(originally published in 1945): The leaders of the Bush administration’s war on
Iraq became difficult to distinguish from
the leaders of the Kennedy-Johnson administrations’ war in Vietnam. It also
became painfully clear that the aptness
of the phrase “lions led by donkeys” has
long outlived World War I.
Record’s analysis of the practical problems in how the administration has
handled conflict termination, stability
operations, and nation building is extremely useful. To know what needs to
be done right you have to know what
has been done wrong, and Record does
an excellent job of addressing the weaknesses in the “Bush doctrine,” the differences between Saddam Hussein and
Osama Bin Laden, the problems with
U.S. war aims, the rationale for the war,
and the failure to size or shape the invasion force for nation building. Record’s
critique may not be balanced or objective,
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but it is all the more useful for this.
Record presents a clearly defined thesis
that is to be rejected or accepted, and
that makes the reader focus on the major strategic issues of the war.
The last two chapters deal with the
“peace” that followed Saddam’s fall and
its broader implications for the future
exercise of American power. Anyone
interested in the transformation of the
U.S. military, future grand strategy, and
dealings with conflict termination
should read these chapters. One way or
another, the United States is going to
have to deal with such issues again and
again, as long as it is the world’s preeminent military power. Even if the United
States can eventually meet some definition of “success” in Iraq, it will still
have to deal with the lingering impact
of political and strategic mistakes that
Record describes so well at the end of
Dark Victory.
In short, this is a remarkably insightful
book, one that raises precisely the issues
that need to be resolved when assessing
the Iraq war and shaping an American
strategic posture for the future.
ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN

Burke Chair in Strategy
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Ganor, Boaz. The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A
Guide for Decision Makers. New Brunswick, N.J.:
Transaction, 2005. 334pp. $39.95

Among a cacophony of authors on terrorism writing since September 2001 is
a small but refreshing group who offer
specific, pragmatic, and tested solutions. Boaz Ganor joins this select few
with a book aptly subtitled A Guide for
Decision Makers. Ganor splendidly
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captures inescapable fundamental
truths. First, defining terrorism is
fraught with politics, emotion, and legal
quandaries; however, the world must
reach a consensus in order to move toward solutions. Second, democracies
are uniquely vulnerable to terrorism,
and they are struggling with the question of whether to treat terrorism as a
crime or as a method of war. Third, efforts to counter terrorism must be
multigenerational. Finally, decision
makers can and must take steps to inoculate society against the effects of terrorism, through a comprehensive
education campaign.
This book is based on Ganor’s doctoral
dissertation, Israel’s Counter-Terrorism
Strategy, written for the Hebrew University. Israel is the only liberal democracy in
the Middle East. Using the Israeli model,
Ganor observes that democracies are
uniquely vulnerable to terrorism where
government must defend itself yet maintain principles of transparency, rule of
law, and representative governance while
remaining mindful of world opinion.
Ganor explores ten explicit dilemmas that
face democratic nations: defining the
threat; defining counterterrorism; employing intelligence; deterrence policy;
choosing offensive and defensive actions;
public opinion and ethics; legislative and
punitive policies; media coverage; damage
to societal morale; and finally, dilemmas
concerning international cooperation.
Ganor warns that if terrorism remains a
subjective concept influenced by one’s
point of view, solutions will be similarly amorphous. Without consensus
on the definition of what constitutes
terrorism, global efforts to defeat it
will fail. Ganor begins with a well considered definition of terrorism, including a rigorous analysis of why
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